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## PUBLIC LECTURE

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# **Rough Justice**

CHAIR: Antonella Besussi Università degli Studi di Milano

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#### Abstract

Informal justice often is castigated as rough justice, procedurally unauthorized and substan-

tively unrationalized and prone to error. Yet those same features are present, to some extent, in formal justice as well: they do not form the basis for any sharp categorical contrast between formal and informal justice. Furthermore, some roughness in justice may be no bad thing. Certain of those elements of roughness in formal justice are inextricably bound up with other features of formal justice that are rightly deemed morally important. And rough informal justice can be sometimes be used to change formal justice in more just directions.

